General Overview The Nanking Massacre is considered one of the most severe war crimes of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The event did not occur in a single day and was not merely an execution operation conducted from a single center. It consisted of numerous crimes committed by different Japanese units during and after the fall of the city, which were cumulative in nature. The mass killing of soldiers who had surrendered or lost the ability to fight; the abduction of civilian men under the pretext that they were "soldiers out of uniform"; the kidnapping of women and girls from homes, streets, and shelters; the looting of houses, shops, and public buildings; and the burning of certain neighborhoods were the main forms of these crimes. It is difficult to determine the scale of the events. The primary reason for this is that the geographical area and time frame referred to when mentioning "Nanking" can vary from researcher to researcher. A study that counts only the civilians within the city walls will not reach the same conclusion as a study that takes into account the execution sites around the city, the banks of the Yangtze River, prisoners of war, and the massacres along the routes of the advancing units toward Nanking. The burning of corpses or their disposal in the river, the deficiencies in burial records, and the possibility of the same death appearing on multiple lists also complicate the calculations. Nevertheless, there is no uncertainty in serious historiography regarding whether the massacre occurred. War reports and diaries from Japanese military units, records from Chinese and foreign witnesses, burial and damage surveys, diplomatic correspondence, and documents presented in post-war courts confirm the existence of mass crimes. The debate primarily revolves around how to calculate the total death toll, where to draw the temporal and spatial boundaries of the crimes, and how to allocate responsibility among different command levels. The event was referred to for a long time in English sources as Rape of Nanking . The word "rape" here carried a figurative meaning that described both the widespread rapes in the city and the looting and destruction of Nanking as a whole. Today, names such as Nanking Massacre , Nanjing Massacre , and Nanking Atrocity are also used. The most common equivalent in Turkish is Nanking Katliamı . As much as the differences in naming, where the event began and ended in terms of time and space is also one of the fundamental issues of historiography. There are three main approaches regarding the scope of the concept of "massacre": Narrow scope: Approximately six weeks after December 13, 1937, the walls of Nanking and its immediate surroundings. Medium scope: The city, suburbs, the Yangtze riverbank, execution sites like Mufushan, and the Nanking Special Administrative Region. Broad scope: Regional violence extending from before December 1937 to the early months of 1938, including killings, rapes, looting, and arson committed by Japanese troops while advancing from Shanghai to Nanking. Fujiwara Akira delineates the boundaries of the event between December 1, 1937, and January 5, 1938, covering the line where two Japanese armies converged towards Nanking and both banks of the Yangtze. Other researchers use shorter or longer periods. Therefore, different numbers do not always directly refute each other; they sometimes measure different clusters of events. The War's Reach to Nanking Japan's military pressure on China did not begin in 1937. The Japanese army had invaded Manchuria in 1931 and established a dependent administration called Manchukuo there. The conflict that occurred on July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing was transformed from a limited military incident into a large-scale war. While the Japanese government and general staff sent new troops to the region, nationalist resistance against Japanese aggression strengthened in China. The war spread to Shanghai in August 1937. The Chinese government aimed to halt the Japanese advance by defending this major port city, which had high international interest, and to gain external support. The Battle of Shanghai, lasting about three months, resulted in heavy losses for both sides. While the Japanese army expected a quick victory, it lost thousands of soldiers; the troops were worn out, a need for reinforcements arose, and it became clear that the war could not be concluded quickly. When the Chinese defense in Shanghai was broken in November 1937, Chinese forces retreated westward towards Nanking. The Japanese central command had not initially planned to attack Nanking immediately. The mission of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was limited to defeating the Chinese forces around Shanghai and protecting Japanese citizens. However, commanders on the ground wanted to pursue the retreating Chinese army and reach the capital. The official order to attack Nanking was given on December 1; some units had crossed the predetermined stopping lines before this date. The irregularity of the advance laid the groundwork for subsequent crimes. The Japanese army had not been sent to Nanking with sufficient supplies and support units for a long operation. The rapidly marching troops frequently forced the local population to meet their food and material needs. Discipline issues, racist and derogatory attitudes towards the Chinese, the failure to apply the laws of war, and the inability of the very few military police to control hundreds of thousands of soldiers facilitated the violence. In the towns and villages along the route to Nanking, incidents of looting, arson, rape, and murder were observed. The fall of the capital and the beginning of the massacre Siege, retreat, and occupation Nanking had been the capital of the Republic of China since 1928. As the Japanese army approached, government institutions, a large portion of foreign embassies, wealthy families, and civilians who could leave the city retreated to the interior regions. A significant part of those who remained in the city were the poor, who could not afford transportation and housing costs. Sources indicate that the population, which was close to one million before the war, fell to about 200,000-250,000 on the eve of the attack; some contemporary estimates are lower. Chinese commander Tang Shengzhi announced that Nanking would be defended until the end. The closing of the city gates, the control of transportation vehicles, and the burning of buildings for military purposes in some areas made it difficult for both soldiers and civilians to exit. As Japanese troops besieged the city from the east and south, the Japanese navy on the river and troops crossing to the north bank of the Yangtze also threatened escape routes. The Japanese command called for surrender on December 9. Members of the International Committee also tried to secure a ceasefire for the city to be handed over without fighting. Although Tang was positive towards these initiatives at some stages, Chiang Kai-shek's approval could not be obtained. When the order to retreat was given on the evening of December 12, there was no organized evacuation plan. The command chain collapsed as Tang and his headquarters crossed the Yangtze. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers tried to flee towards Yijiang Gate and the Xiaguan wharf. There was a crowd at the gates; there were not enough boats on the river. Some soldiers tried to take off their uniforms and find civilian clothes, some surrendered by dropping their weapons, while others attempted to swim or use makeshift means to cross to the other side. Japanese troops entered Nanking in the early hours of December 13. Organized Chinese resistance within the city had largely come to an end, but this did not ensure the safety of those who surrendered. Crimes against prisoners of war and civilians One of the largest death groups of the massacre consisted of prisoners of war and soldiers who had lost their capacity to fight. Japanese unit reports contain expressions indicating that thousands of prisoners were "liquidated," "eliminated," or "finished off." For example, the report of the 33rd Regiment states that 3,096 prisoners taken on December 13 were killed. Another unit record states that 328 prisoners were shot dead. These documents show that the executions were carried out not only from the momentary anger of a few soldiers but also through orders and planning in at least some units. The events near Mufushan are among the most studied examples of these executions. There are Japanese sources stating that the Yamada Detachment of the 13th Division captured more than 14,000 prisoners. Post-war narratives about the prisoners being released or killed during a rebellion contradict the diaries, letters, and other records of the unit members. In the study compiled by Wakabayashi, Ono Kenji argues that the prisoners here were systematically killed. It is debated whether all executions stemmed from a single general order. Iris Chang highlights the claim that an order to "kill all prisoners" was issued from Prince Asaka's headquarters; it is unclear who prepared the order and whether Asaka's direct approval exists. In contrast, the existence of orders at specific regiment and battalion levels can be demonstrated with more solid evidence. Therefore, when assessing command responsibility, it is necessary to separate proven unit orders from controversial claims about higher command. Chinese soldiers who took off their uniforms and sought refuge in the Security Zone became a pretext for the Japanese army to carry out raids in the area. Japanese troops could count soldiers by looking at the helmet, backpack, or weapon-carrying marks on their bodies; their hairstyles; the mismatch of their clothing; or simply their ages. These individuals were often taken away and killed without a proper investigation or military tribunal. It is acknowledged even in the daily records of Japanese soldiers that among those who had truly removed their uniforms, there were also civilians. This practice was criminal from the perspective of the laws of war for two reasons. First, surrendered or non-resisting soldiers should have been protected under prisoner of war status. Second, carrying out mass executions without establishing a reliable process to distinguish between civilians and military personnel made civilian deaths inevitable. Records indicating that 6,670 people were killed as a result of the 7th Regiment's scanning activities in the Security Zone demonstrate the scale of this practice. After the fall of the city, violence was not limited to the execution of prisoners. Japanese soldiers entered homes and shelters, pulling out men; some were taken under suspicion of being soldiers, while others were taken for forced labor or to be used as guides. A significant portion of those taken did not return. In the records prepared by Minnie Vautrin in Ginling, 592 application forms were arranged for missing husbands and sons; 432 of these were related to individuals taken on just December 16. This record does not cover all of Nanking, but it shows the extent of loss experienced by families in a single shelter center. Murders in the street, stabbing, beatings, and firing upon civilians who do not understand the orders of soldiers repeatedly appear in witness diaries. The suspicion that individuals are military personnel turned into a broad excuse that legitimized random violence. Some of the murders were linked to looting; money, food, bedding, clothing, and valuables were taken after residents were removed or killed. One of the distinguishing features of the Nanking Massacre is the prevalence of sexual violence. Women and girls were forcibly taken from their homes, streets, and shelters; incidents of rape, gang rape, and subsequent murder were recorded. Due to the fear of social stigma among victims, families hiding the incidents, and many victims being killed, it is im